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Abstract
There is a rich literature analyzing the problems that will arise
as the share of elderly and retired in the population increases in the
near future. However, the locational decisions among the elderly as
well as their implications in terms of taxes/transfers and of allocation
of responsibilities for elderly care between the federal and local levels
have not received much attention. In this paper we aim at investigating
these issues. For this purpose we explore a model where there is a
big city and a set of small villages, and where congestion eﬀects and
agglomeration forces are at work at the level of the big city. We also
assume that the population is divided between two groups of agents,
workers and retired, which diﬀer with respect to the degree of mobility.
In the ﬁrst part of the paper we study and characterize the ineﬃciencies
that arise because of individuals’ free location choice in the context of
a unitary government. In the second part of the paper we consider a
ﬁscal federalism structure and we investigate the suitable instruments
that are needed in order to decentralize the optimal allocation obtained
under full centralization.
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In many developed countries, the share of elderly and retired in the popula-
tion will rise considerably in the near future. This aging of the population
poses several problems, and there is a rich literature analyzing them. How-
ever, the locational decisions among the elderly, as well as their implications
in terms of taxes/transfers and the allocation of responsibilities for elderly
care between the federal and local levels of government, have not received
much attention so far. In this paper, we aim at investigating these issues.
A basic observation in several countries is the tendency towards a ge-
ographically unbalanced demographic structure, with the “villages” being
populated mainly by elderly people, and the “big cities” to a greater extent
populated by people in working ages. A possible explanation to this phe-
nomenon is given by a life-cycle pattern of mobility behavior. For instance,
people may live in the small communities, where they were born, until they
have ﬁnished high school. Then, they move to the “big cities” and work for
many years. When becoming old, quite a few return back to the region from
where they came or to a region where they consider the living conditions
(climate) to be pleasurable. Another possibility is that the mobility pattern
is part of a long-term transition process, which has been going on for at
least a hundred years, where the country-side is depopulated and the big
cities increase in size. Those who move away from the country-side typically
do so when young. This also contributes to a geographically unbalanced
demographic structure.
Clearly, a geographically unbalanced demographic structure may be per-
fectly consistent with the notion of eﬃciency. The basic argument is that
it may be cheaper to provide elderly care in the country-side than in the
big city. Elderly living in the big city contribute to congestion, higher land
prices, etc., without adding to the production capacity. We will elaborate on
this in more detail below. Depending on how the grant system is designed,
especially in countries with publicly provided elderly care, as in the Nordic
countries, this unbalanced demographic structure can lead to ﬁnancial prob-
lems for small villages, since the local taxable income might be too small to
ﬁnance high quality care for the elderly.1
Transfers to the poor parts of a country are often motivated by income
redistribution arguments, and individuals living in the big cities sometimes
complain about these transfers. However, given that elderly care is publicly
provided, and if it is cheaper to provide elderly care in the country-side than
in the big city, it may be better for those working in the big cities to transfer
money to the country-side, allowing good care for the elderly there, instead
of having the elderly living in the big cities, in which case they would still
1Korpi (2003) describes a very unbalanced demographic structure in Sweden, where
the population in the country-side largely consists of elderly people, while Stockholm has
a population with a larger share of people in working ages.
1have to pay for their care via taxes. One can, therefore, provide eﬃciency
arguments for transfers from the big city to the country-side.
Throughout the paper, we assume that elderly care is publicly provided.
Without going into a detailed argument of why this might be a desirable pol-
icy, we want to point to three motivations for considering publicly provided
care for the elderly. First, it is a common phenomenon in many countries
that some form of basic elderly care is publicly provided, often at the local
level. Second, the same type of tax base arguments as those proposed in
Bergstrom and Blomquist (1996) for public subsidies to day care are also
valid for elderly care, as are the arguments put forward by Boadway and
Marchand (1995), Blomquist and Christiansen (1995) and Cremer and Gah-
vari (1997) that public provision of certain private goods can mitigate self-
selection constraints and thereby help income redistribution. Third, without
public pensions, some individuals may want to free ride, i.e. not saving for
their old age, by counting on being helped out by others when old (see e.g.
Buchanan (1975), Kotlikoﬀ (1987) and Lindbeck and Weibull (1988)). To
avoid this free riding, a society could use a public pension scheme forcing
everyone to save for their old age. This type of argument is also valid for
public provision of elderly care.
There are two salient diﬀerences between the big city and the country-
side that we want to capture in our model. First, there is congestion in
the big city, while there is no congestion in the country-side. Congestion
can take several forms like bad air quality and/or scarce land resources
leading to high costs for housing and long times for commuting. Retired and
earners contribute in the same way towards the congestion. Second, there
are agglomeration eﬀects in the big city, in the sense that the marginal and
average products of workers increase with the number of people working in
the consumption goods industry.2 Workers contribute to the agglomeration
eﬀects, whereas the retired do not.
Our paper relates to a large, and growing, literature on ﬁscal federal-
ism dealing with the interactions within the public sector, as well as how a
federal government must act in order to implement eﬃciency aspects of a
unitary resource allocation. Several earlier studies concentrate on ﬁscal ex-
ternal eﬀects, and a distinction is commonly made between horizontal3 and
vertical4 external eﬀects. Our paper, on the other hand, focuses on redistri-
2For an evaluation of the relevance of such agglomeration eﬀects, see the analyses by
Ciccone and Hall (1996) and Glaeser and Mare (2001).
3A standard reference here is Oates (1972). Wildasin (1991) shows how horizontal
external eﬀects associated with mobility can be internalized by means of a system of
matching grants from the central to the local governments.
4Vertical external eﬀects may arise from co-occupancy of a common tax base. Typically,
the local authorities do not recognize that their policies aﬀect the central authority’s tax
base. This was pointed out by Hansson and Stuart (1987) and Johnson (1988). Methods
to internalize vertical ﬁscal external eﬀects have been discussed by e.g. Boadway and Keen
(1996), Dahlby (1996), Boadway et al. (1998), Sato (2000) and Aronsson and Wikström
2bution and population mobility. An important reference here is Boadway et
al. (2003) dealing with redistribution and equalization in the context of an
economic federation.5 They assume that individuals diﬀer in ability, and all
ability-types are mobile across local jurisdictions. Their main contribution
is to characterize the behavior of the local and central governments in the
context of a federal decision-structure as well as studying how a unitary op-
timum can be decentralized. Our study diﬀers from Boadway et al. (2003)
in several respects. For example, in Boadway et al. the public sector pro-
vides a local public good whereas in our model it provides the private good
elderly care to the population subgroup given by the elderly. It is true that
regions can diﬀer in productivity conditions in the Boadway et al. model.
However, the basic structure of all the regions is the same. In our model,
due to the fact that we incorporate agglomeration eﬀects and congestion
in the big city, there is a fundamental asymmetry between the two types
of regions. This has important implications for the structure of incentives
underlying the public policy in the economic federation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the
basic assumptions of our model and how individuals make their locational
decisions. The basic model could be used to study how an inadequate choice
of instruments leads to the kind of diﬃculties described in the introduction,
with severe problems for small villages to ﬁnance elderly care. However, to
save space we begin our analysis considering how an optimal tax/transfer
system should be designed. Thus, as a benchmark, we describe the ﬁrst
best in Section 3, where the policy maker is assumed to decide upon each
individual’s consumption, the quality of elderly care as well as each person’s
location. As one of the starting points for the literature on the eﬀects of
mobility, Tiebout (1956) made strong claims that free mobility leads to
an eﬃcient allocation. Within our framework we obtain the opposite result,
namely that free mobility leads to ineﬃciencies. Given the popular view that
free mobility is eﬃciency-enhancing, we believe it is of interest to see how
free mobility hampers the possibilities to achieve the ﬁrst best, and how the
incentives of the individuals diﬀer from those of the social planner (due to the
congestion and agglomeration eﬀects). Thus, in Section 4, we consider how
the results are aﬀected, if the policy maker is free to set all variables except
those associated with the individuals’ locations. In Section 5, we consider
a federation structure with local governments (deciding about local income
taxation and elderly care quality) and a federal government (deciding about
pensions and intergovernmental transfers). Our analysis explains why the
lower level governments may have incentives to deviate from the second best,
and identiﬁes the policy instruments needed by the federal government in
order to decentralize the second best resource allocation discussed in Section
(2001).
5See also Boadway et al. (1998).
34. Section 6 concludes and discusses the policy implications of our analysis.
2 General model and individuals’ location deci-
sions
There is one big city and a given number, normalized to one, of small iden-
tical villages. There are two types of individuals:6 productive people (e)
t h a tw o r ka n de a r na ni n c o m ea n dr e t i r e dp e o p l e( r) who need care. Within
each type, everyone is identical. Individuals can either live in the city or in
the country-side and earners are assumed to work in the place where they




v to represent the
number of retired living in the big city, the number of earners living in the
big city, the number of retired living in a village and the number of earners






To keep the model tractable, we disregard the labor supply decision; each
earner supplies one unit of labor inelastically. The utility of earners only
depends on consumption and is represented by u(c),w h e r ec denotes private
consumption. The only decision made by each earner is where to live. On
the other hand, the retired both consume the consumption good and elderly
care. Their utility is given by u(c)+φ(q),w h e r eq denotes the quality of
the care. The quality of elderly care is assumed to be directly proportional
to the number of earners used to take care of each retired person. Also for
them the only decision variable is the place where they reside.
In the city, which has a ﬁxed area, there is a given number of (many)
ﬁrms, each with a constant returns to scale production function. However,
due to agglomeration eﬀects, the marginal and average products of labor are
increasing in the total number of individuals working in the consumption
goods industry, i.e. the average and marginal product is given by w =
F (Ne
b − qNr
b) with F0 > 0.7 Here, qNr
b denotes the number of earners that
is needed to take care of the elderly living in the big city for a given level,
q, of the quality of the service provided. Thus, the elderly and those taking
care of the elderly do not contribute to the agglomeration eﬀects. In the
big city, there is also congestion; this is represented by the function m(Nb),
with properties m(·) < 0 and m0 (·) < 0, which gives the congestion imposed
on each city-dweller.
In the villages, there is neither congestion nor agglomeration eﬀects. The
l a b o rr e q u i r e dt ot a k ec a r eo fNr
v retired people is qNr
v. The production of
6To have three or more types would only complicate matters without adding any new
qualitative insights.
7With a ﬁxed area the density of workers will increase with the number of workers in
the big city. See Ciccone and Hall (1996) both for a model of how productivity depends
on population density of workers as well as for empirical evidence.
4the consumption good is given by the constant returns to scale technology
Qv =( Ne
v − qNr
v)θ,w h e r eθ is a constant. Since there is no congestion,
providing elderly care in the country-side is cheaper than in the big city.
Much of the focus in this paper will be on the individuals’ location de-
cisions. To reﬂect the circumstance that the cost of mobility seems to vary
over the life-cycle, we assume that earners are perfectly mobile across juris-
dictions, whereas elderly people are imperfectly mobile.8 For earners, the




b) − m(Nb). (1)
Therefore, if ∆e > 0, an earner prefers to live in a village; if ∆e =0 ,h e / s h e
is indiﬀerent; and if ∆e < 0, he/she prefers to live in the big city.
Regarding the elderly, we assume that they are characterized by an
attachment to home element, and that the attachment varies in strength
among the retired. This is accomplished by following the approach of
Wellisch (1994). Ranking the retired according to the strength of their
attachment to a village in such a way that the individual with strongest
attachment is numbered Nr









b) − φ(qb) − hNr
j − m(Nb). (2)
If ∆r
j > 0, the individual prefers to live in a village; if ∆r
j =0 ,h e / s h ei s
indiﬀerent; and if ∆r
j < 0, he/she prefers to live in the big city.
3 First best analysis
The policy maker maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function. To facili-
tate comparisons with the second best analysis of Section 4, we use region
speciﬁc lump-sum taxes to control the consumptions among the earners in





The ﬁrst and second best analyses are quite similar. The only diﬀerence
is that, in the second best, we must consider two migration constraints that
do not appear in the ﬁr s tb e s tp r o b l e m . T os a v eo ns p a c e ,w es t a r tb y
presenting the policy maker’s second best problem. Formally, this can be
represented as:
8See Topel (1986) for an empirical analysis showing that the degree of mobility among
young agents is larger than among the old; for a theoretical model incorporating the














































v + θqv) ≥ 0( µ)
Ne
v − qvNr













b +hNr =0 ( λ2),
as well as subject to Ne
b = Ne − Ne
v and Nr
b = Nr − Nr
v.
The ﬁrst constraint is the government’s budget constraint. The second
constraint states that the number of earners in the village must at least be
suﬃcient to take care of the elderly living there. The last two constraints
are migration constraints that we do not need to consider in the ﬁrst best.
The labels (µ), (γ), (λ1)a n d( λ2) refer to the Lagrange multipliers attached
to the constraints.
We assume there exists an interior solution to the problem above in the
sense that there will be a nonzero population of earners and retired both
in the representative village and in the big city. The ﬁrst order conditions
are presented in the Appendix. Setting λ1 and λ2 to zero we obtain the
conditions that deﬁne the ﬁrst best.
Here, we summarize the main results characterizing the ﬁrst best and
give the basic intuition behind them.



























φ(qv) − φ(qb)+h[Nr − 2Nr













Proof. With λ1 = λ2 =0 , eqs. (18-21) in the Appendix reduce to
(3), while eqs. (22) and (23) reduce to (4) and (5). Using the identities
ce
b = F (·)−Te
b and ce
v = θ−Te
v, and since (3) implies equalization of agents’
consumption, we can rewrite (24) and (25) as (6) and (7).
The consumption good is perfectly transferable. Hence, it is no surprise
that the ﬁrst best is characterized by the equalization of the marginal utility
of consumption for all agents (see eq. (3)). Given the assumption of additive
separability, it also follows that the consumption is equal across all individ-
uals. This means, in turn, that the lump-sum tax paid by the earners in the
big city should exceed the lump-sum tax paid by the earners in the village,
and that pensions should not be diﬀerentiated across space. However, el-
derly care is instead not transferable; what is produced in the village cannot
be transferred to the big city and vice versa. Equations (4) and (5) imply
that the quality of elderly care should be set so that its marginal utility (the
left hand side) equals its marginal cost (the right hand side). From equation
(6), it follows that µ[F +( Ne
b − qbNr
b)F0] >µ θ+ γ, meaning that at an
optimum the marginal cost of elderly care is higher in the big city than in
the village. Therefore, equations (4) and (5) require that the quality level
of elderly care in the country-side should be higher than in the big city:
qv >q b.
Equations (6) and (7) give the conditions for an optimal population
distribution. From eq. (6), we see that the policy maker sets the number of
earners in the village in such a way that the sum of the Lagrange multiplier
γ and the welfare-enhancing eﬀect of lowering congestion in the big city
exactly balances the value of the net reduction in production (given by both
a direct decrease F −θ but also by a loss (Ne
b − qbNr
b)F0 due to a weakening
of the agglomeration eﬀects). This implies that an individual earner and the
policy maker evaluate the locational beneﬁts and costs diﬀerently.
Since at a ﬁrst best resource allocation the consumption of earners is
equalized across localities, the only remaining term in (1) is the congestion
term. Therefore, earners would strictly prefer to live in a village.9 By
9This result requiring an unequal treatment of equals is reminiscent of similar ﬁndings
emphasized by Mirrlees (1972) and Hartwick (1980).
7combining eqs. (1) and (6), we see that the policy maker values the village
versus the big city according to
∆p







From the point of view of the policy maker, therefore, there are three
additional eﬀects in comparison with the decision rule facing the earner.
First, the policy maker also recognizes that an extra person in the village
reduces congestion in the big city, Nbm0.T h i se ﬀect works in the direction
of allocating more earners to the villages. Second, if the number of earners
i nt h ec o u n t r y - s i d ei sj u s ts u ﬃcient to take care of the elderly, and no pro-
duction of the consumption good takes place locally, an additional earner
is valuable also because he/she relaxes the binding γ-constraint. Third, an
increase in the number of earners living in a village reduces output, which
is captured by the term F +( Ne
b − qbNr
b)F0 − θ.
According to (7), the beneﬁt of moving an additional retiree from the
big city to the village (the left hand side of the equation) should exactly
balance the cost (represented by the right hand side of the equation) of such
ar e a l l o c a t i o n .T h eﬁrst group of terms (φ(qv) − φ(qb)+h[Nr − 2Nr
v]) on
the left hand side represents the net welfare gain in terms of increased utility
of elderly care and attachment to home. The second term, −γqv,r e ﬂects
the cost due to a tightening of the γ-constraint when an additional retired
is moved to the country-side; if some production of the consumption good
takes place also in the country-side, the γ-constraint is not binding and this
term vanishes. Finally, there is the gain in terms of reduced congestion in
the city which is given by −(Nbm0 + m). On the right hand side we have
the net budget cost of moving an additional retired to the country-side.
This can be decomposed into two components; (i) a direct eﬀect due to the
diﬀerence between the per-retired expenditure on elderly care in the village
a n di nt h eb i gc i t y ,qvθ − qbF, and (ii) an indirect cost saving eﬀect due to
the presence of agglomeration forces, −qb [(Ne
b − qbNr
b)F0].
It may be of interest to compare the policy maker’s valuation of the mar-
ginal retired person moving from the big city to a village with the valuation
made by the marginal individual himself/herself. We can write the policy
maker’s valuation as
∆p









In comparison with the valuation made by the marginal individual him-
self/herself, the policy maker recognizes also in this case three additional
eﬀects. First, the congestion eﬀect −Nbm0 (which contributes to reduce the
population in the big city). Second, the cost −γqv related to the need of
8moving additional earners to the country-side, or lowering the quality of el-
derly care provided there, if the γ-constraint is binding. Third, the term Ξ
shows how output changes as a retired is moved from the big city to a village.
There is a direct increase in output by the amount qbF in the big city and a
corresponding decrease by qvθ in the village. However, since there now are
qb more workers in the consumption industry in the big city, an additional
increase in output by qb(Ne
b − qbNr
b)F0 is due to the agglomeration forces.
D e p e n d i n go nt h er e l a t i v es i z eo fqb and qv the term Ξ can be either positive
or negative. Therefore, we cannot in general sign ∆r;t h i sw o u l dr e q u i r e
additional assumptions. For instance, for suﬃciently strong increases in the
congestion eﬀect, ∆r would be negative and the marginal retiree would like
to move from a village to the big city. However, it is in general possible that
∆r is positive, implying that the marginal retired would like to move from
the big city to a village.
To sum up, in the results corresponding to the ﬁr s tb e s tt h em a r g i n a l
utility of consumption should be equal across individuals. Due to congestion
in the big city the marginal cost of elderly care will be lower in the village
and for this reason the quality of elderly care will be higher in the village
than in the big city. The allocation of individuals will be such that earners
would like to move to a village. In general there would be retired wishing
to move, but we cannot tell whether there would be retired in the big city
that would like to move to a village or vice versa.
4 Second best analysis
We have seen that the ﬁrst best is characterized by an allocation of individ-
uals such that at least part of the population would like to move. Such an
outcome is, of course, not sustainable in a setting where agents can freely
c h o o s ew h e r et ol i v e . I ti st h e r e f o r ea p p r o p r i a t et h a tw en o wc o n s i d e rt h e
consequences of free mobility of individuals for the optimal policy chosen
by the government. However, we still assume that the policy maker has in-
struments which allow him/her to perfectly control consumption and elderly
care quality. Thus, the only choice left to people is the choice of residence.
To deal with this case, we continue to treat Nr
v and Ne
v as the government’s
control variables while adding the migration equilibrium conditions as con-
straints in its optimization problem.10 The problem is the one presented
on p. 6 and including the λ1 and λ2 constraints. Proposition 2 provides a
characterization of the second best optimum.
































































v + θqv − cr





Proof. See the Appendix.
Eqs. (10)-(13) show that at a second best solution the migration equi-
librium constraints prevent in general the attainment of the result that the
marginal utility of consumption is equalized across agents. In fact, since
the ﬁrst best solution was characterized by an unequal treatment of earners,
with the welfare of workers in the big city being lower than the welfare of
workers in the country-side, the migration equilibrium constraint λ1 is bind-
ing at the second best solution. Moreover, it can be easily shown that the
Lagrange multiplier λ1 is positive.11 Thus, according to (12) and (13) the
marginal utility of consumption for earners should be higher in the village
than in the big city. Therefore, in contrast to the ﬁrst best where earners’
disposable income is equal in the big city and the village, in the second best
the disposable income of earners should be higher in the big city than in
the village. With regards to the elderly, note that whereas the migration
equilibrium constraint is in general binding, it is not possible to sign un-
ambiguously the corresponding Lagrange multiplier λ2.12 In other words,
although the consumption (i.e. pensions) for the elderly should be diﬀeren-
tiated between big city and country-side, whether it should be higher in the
former or in the latter depends respectively on whether λ2 turns out to be
positive or negative.

















e. In order to satisfy the equilibrium migration constraint for










b) and λ1 > 0.











v) (>< 0). If at an optimum λ2 < (>)0, then the amount of
pension granted to a retiree in the country side is larger than the amount of pension
granted to a retiree in the big city.
10From equation (14), we see that the marginal utility of elderly care is
no longer equal to its marginal cost. In the village the marginal utility is
equal to the marginal cost scaled by the factor Nr
v/(Nr
v − λ2). According
to equation (15), there is a similar scaling of the marginal cost in the big
city, although the equilibrium condition also contains a term showing how
the consumption of earners and, consequently, the constraint λ1 are aﬀected
as qb is increased.
Eqs. (16) and (17) are the two conditions characterizing the optimal
population distribution. Starting with (16), the right hand side reﬂects the
net budget cost of inducing an additional earner to move to the country-
side. It can be decomposed into two components. The ﬁrst depends on the
diﬀerence between the lump-sum tax levied on an earner in the big city and
the lump-sum tax levied on an earner in the village, F − θ + ce
v − ce
b.T h e
second reﬂects the cost increasing eﬀect due to reduced beneﬁts associated
with agglomeration in the big city, (Ne
b − qbNr
b)F0. On the left hand side,
the ﬁrst two terms are nonnegative. The ﬁrst one measures the beneﬁta s -
sociated with relaxing the γ-constraint, whereas the term −(Nb + λ1)m0
reﬂects part of the welfare eﬀects following from reduced congestion in the
big city when an additional earner moves to the country-side. It is unam-
biguously positive, since it can be shown that λ1 > 0. The last term on
the left side of (16) accounts for the remaining welfare eﬀect due to reduced
congestion costs in the big city. However, its sign is ambiguous since, as we
have seen above, it is not in general possible to sign λ2.Ap o s i t i v ev a l u eo f
λ2 would imply an additional beneﬁt associated with a marginal increase in
the number of earners living in the village, whereas a negative value would
imply an additional cost.
Turning to equation (17), the right hand side reﬂects the diﬀerence be-
tween the value of the resources absorbed by a retired person in the village
and in the big city together with the value of the change in the beneﬁts
associated with agglomeration. The latter provides an evaluation of the
beneﬁt for the government’s budget following from a marginal relocation of
elderly from the big city to the village. On the left hand side, the term
−(Nb + λ1)m0 is positive since λ1 > 0. The second term, −γqv,i sl e s st h a n
or equal to zero depending on whether or not the γ-constraint is binding.
It measures the cost of a tightening of the γ-constraint due to an increase
in the number of retired in the village. Finally, the sign of the third term
on the left hand side is ambiguous; given that m0 − 2h is negative, a mar-
ginal increase in the number of elderly living in the village would entail an
additional beneﬁt (cost) from the government’s perspective if λ2 > (<)0.
115T h e f e d e r a l c a s e
In this Section, we abandon the assumption of full centralization and assume
the existence of local policy makers that are responsible for the provision of
elderly care and, at least partly, for the funding of it. We assume that each
local government decides upon the level of the local tax paid by the earners
and the expenditures on elderly care subject to its budget constraint and the
migration responses by the employed and elderly, respectively. The budget
balance of other governments is, however, ignored: from the local perspec-
tive, the public revenues and expenditures of other localities are taken as
given. Pensions are directly decided upon by the federal government; an
assumption which is realistic from a practical perspective. To be more spe-
ciﬁc, the policy instruments decided upon by the federal government are the
pensions facing the residents of the big city and the village, respectively, i.e.
cr
b and cr
v, a set of subsidies proportional to the population of earners and





v, and redistributive lump-sum taxes/transfers,
Gb and Gv. The last pair of instruments is standard and means that the fed-
eral government can redistribute resources lump-sum between the two levels
of government. The idea behind the subsidies proportional to the number
o fe a r n e r sa n de l d e r l yi ne a c hl o c a l i t yi sd i s c u s s e db e l o w .
The order of decision making is as follows. In the ﬁrst stage, the fed-






v, Gb and Gv anticipating the
behavioral responses of the local governments and the private sector. In the
second stage, the local government in locality j (j = b,v) chooses the lump-
sum tax to be paid by the earners, τe
j, and the public expenditures on elderly
care quality, qj, taking as given the federal government’s policy instruments
while anticipating the behavioral responses of the private sector. Each local
government treats the other local government as a Nash competitor in the
sense of regarding the variables decided upon by the government in the other
locality as exogenous. Finally, in the third stage, the private agents choose
their place of residence treating the public decision variables (decided upon
by both levels of government) as exogenous.
5.1 The Local Policy Problem
Each local government uses income taxation together with transfer payments
from the federal government to ﬁnance the expenditures on elderly care. Let
us start by brieﬂy characterizing each such decision-problem. The problem
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b. The Lagrange multiplier associated with each
constraint is given in parenthesis.
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v = θ −τe
v.T h eﬁrst order conditions for both problems are presented
in the Appendix.
135.2 The federal government
It is apparent that, without proper incentives for the local governments,
the population purchase choice would be suboptimal, since the lump-sum
transfers alone are not suﬃcient to accomplish the same incentives as those
underlying the second best resource allocation. Therefore, in order to im-
plement the second best population distribution in the context of a federal
decision-structure, the federal government must have access to policy in-
struments that independently aﬀect the ﬁrst order conditions for Ne
v and
Nr






Given the framework described above, the decision variables facing the
federal government are cr
b, cr




v, and the decision-

































as well as subject to Ne
b = Ne − Ne
v, Nr
b = Nr − Nr








v = θ − τe
v. Note also that the
federal government anticipates how the local governments and the private
sector responds to the public policy decided upon by the federal government.
Therefore, the private and local public budget constraints as well as the ﬁrst
order conditions for the local public decision-problems are also part of the
constraints facing the federal government.
We can now derive the following result:
Proposition 3 Given the set of policy instruments described above, the fed-
eral government can implement the second best resource allocation.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is straightforward. If the federal
government uses the subsidies proportional to the number of earners and
elderly, respectively, in each locality in order to correct for the external ef-
fects associated with mobility as well as uses the lump-sum taxes/transfers
to reproduce the resource distribution in the second best, the population
distribution preferred by each local government will correspond to the pop-
ulation distribution in the second best. What then remains for the federal
14government is to choose cr
b and cr
v to replicate the choices made by the social
planner in the previous Section. The second best levels for the consumption
among the employed and the expenditures on elderly care, respectively, will
then follow from the decisions made by the local governments (choices which
are not themselves distorted by comparison with the second best model).




v required to implement the second
best are given in the Appendix. It is, nevertheless, worthwhile to discuss




be either positive or negative, the optimal se
b is unambiguously negative.
The latter means that the federal government imposes a tax proportional to
the number of earners in the big city (see eq. (36) in the Appendix). This
is so because the local policy maker in the big city tends to over-attract
productive agents disregarding three eﬀects that the corrective tax aims to
internalize. These eﬀects are (i) a pure welfare cost due to the fact that the
utility added to the big city by an additional earner is oﬀset by the utility
lost in the village, (ii) a correction term associated with the γ-constraint
(if it is binding) which recognizes that, if we were to attract an additional
earner from the village to the big city, then this will lower the quality of
the elderly care in the village, and (iii) a correction term due to that the
policy maker in the big city neglects the reduction of the tax base facing the
village, if an additional earner moves from the village to the big city.
The second aspect is that the instruments intended to aﬀect the incen-
tives facing the policy maker in the village, i.e. se
v and sr
v, are designed to
internalize marginal congestion and agglomeration eﬀects. The intuition is,
of course, that the policy maker in the village fails to recognize the welfare
eﬀects of its policy in terms of congestion and agglomeration in the big city.
Note ﬁrst that, in the absence of policy intervention by the federal govern-
ment, the local policy maker in the village would not consider the beneﬁto f
reduced congestion in the big city. From this perspective, therefore, the pol-
icy maker in the village would choose an ineﬃciently low number of agents
of each type, which is what se
v and sr
v (in part) serve to correct. The con-
tribution of agglomeration eﬀects to the formulas for se
v and sr
v are more
complex, since a reallocation of earners and retired between the village and
the big city will inﬂuence both the wage rate paid to earners and the cost
of elderly care in the big city.
The third aspect that we would like to emphasize is that sr
b and sr
v,
in part, serve to correct for a particular type of vertical external eﬀect.
This is so because, when choosing the values of their policy variables, the
local governments ignore that a reallocation of elderly between the village
and the big city inﬂuences the budget constraint of the federal government,
which is due to our assumption that the federal government decides upon
the pensions paid to the retired. 13 Therefore, an additional elderly in the
13Note that the federal government is free to diﬀerentiate the value of the pension given
15village will imply a negative (positive) vertical externality, if the pension
granted to the elderly living in the village is higher (lower) than the pension
granted to the elderly living in the big city.
6 Summary
The starting point of this paper is the observation that there is a tendency
towards a geographically unbalanced demographic structure in many coun-
tries, with the “villages” being mainly populated by non-productive agents,
while the “big cities” to a greater extent are populated by people in working
ages. This unbalance poses a serious threat to the ability of many small juris-
dictions to resort to taxation of local bases in order to ﬁnance a satisfactory
level of public expenditures. At the same time, there are arguments suggest-
ing that such a segmented spatial population distribution is not necessarily
ineﬃcient. To study these issues in more details, and to address the welfare
and eﬃciency consequences of locational decisions among diﬀerent agents,
we examine a model that incorporates agglomeration forces and congestion
eﬀects in the metropolitan areas, and we make the (realistic) assumption
that the degree of mobility of productive agents is in general higher than
the degree of mobility among elderly people. The types of public expendi-
tures we consider throughout the paper are pensions and publicly provided
elderly care.
The ﬁrst part of the analysis characterizes the ﬁr s tb e s tr e s o u r c ea l l o c a -
tion; namely, the allocation that would be chosen by a social planner em-
powered with the authority to freely decide upon the location of each agent.
This resource allocation is not consistent with the underlying preferences
for residential location, meaning that it is not sustainable in a framework
where each consumer makes his/her own locational choice. Therefore, we
also examine a second best regime, where a unitary government decides
upon the public policy (taxation, pensions and elderly care quality) subject
to a set of migration constraints, one for each type of agent. In the ﬁnal
part of the paper, we consider a federal structure, where the responsibility
for the publicly provided elderly care is delegated to the local governments
along with the power to tax the labor income facing the local residents. Our
analysis explains why the lower level governments may have incentives to
deviate from the second best, and identiﬁes the policy instruments needed
by the federal government in order to decentralize the second best resource
allocation.
In the introduction, we discussed potential future problems descending
from an unbalanced demographic structure for the sustainability of a proper
level of publicly provided elderly care under the present system of grants.
However, our analysis shows that with a proper widening of the set of instru-
to the elderly according to the place where they live.
16ments, the allocation of individuals can be controlled such that the second
best resource allocation is obtained. Although perfectly feasible, as far as
we know the kind of instruments considered in our analysis have not been
used in actual policy making. The instruments needed are subsidies/taxes
that are proportional to the number of earners and retired living in the big
city and the village respectively. These subsidies/taxes should be payable by
the local governments. For example, if there is a subsidy per elderly person
given to the local regions, this subsidy should in general be region-speciﬁc.
An interesting result is that there should be a per unit tax on earners in
the big city. Such a tax might raise protests from earners in the big city,
even though it really will beneﬁt them in terms of less congestion and less
expenditures for elderly care in the big city.
There are several possible extensions of our analysis. The most obvi-
ous is, perhaps, the introduction of a labor/leisure choice for the productive
agents in combination with the abandonment of lump-sum taxation. Other
possibilities would be to explicitly consider the functioning of the land mar-
ket and/or introduce mobile capital. We leave these and other extensions
for future research.
7A p p e n d i x
7.1 First order conditions
The ﬁrst order conditions for the problem on page 6 are
(Nr
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The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to Nr
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7.2 Proof of Proposition 2
To get (10), divide (18) by (19). For (14), ﬁrst use (21) to rewrite (23) as
(Nr







Then divide (22) by (26) to get
(Nr
v − λ2)φ0 (qv)
(Nr

















To get (14) multiply both sides of (27) by (Nr
b + λ2)/(Nr
v − λ2).



















v + θqv − cr
b − qbF).
Dividing by µ and using (21) gives (17).





v), eq. (25) can be simpliﬁed to
−Ne
bu0 (ce









Dividing by µ and and using (21) gives (16).
187.3 Proof of Proposition 3
The ﬁrst order conditions for the local policy problem in the big city are
Nr
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The ﬁrst order conditions for the local policy problem in the village are
(Nr
v − λr
v)φ0 (qv) − µvθNr
v − γvNr















































v denote the second best
resource allocation derived in Section 4, whereas µ∗ and γ∗ are associated
Lagrange multipliers. Moreover, deﬁne N∗
b as N∗





Suppose the federal government solves the hypothetical second best problem
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b . Then, if
the lump-sum taxes/transfers are chosen such as to obtain the distribution
of resources across localities implicit in the second best resource allocation,
it follows that the second best resource allocation solves equations (28)-(35).
Note also that, by combining the budget constraints of the federal and local
governments, we obtain the resource constraint for the economy as a whole,
which was used in the second best problem in Section 4.
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